10-11-2022, 03:34 AM
Kindly assist to resolve the below issue.
I am using the version 15.2.62
'SSL/TLS connections are vulnerable to the 'BREACH' (Browser Reconnaissance & Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext) attack.Angelo Prado Neal Harris and Yoel Gluck reported that SSL/TLS attacks are still viable via a 'BREACH' (Browser Reconnaissance & Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext) attack which they describe as: While CRIME was mitigated by disabling TLS/SPDY compression (and by modifying gzip to allow for explicit separation of compression contexts in SPDY) BREACH attacks HTTP responses. These are compressed using the common HTTP compression which is much more common than TLS-level compression. This allows essentially the same attack demonstrated by Duong and Rizzo but without relying on TLS-level compression (as they anticipated). It is important to note that the attack is agnostic to the version of TLS/SSL and does not require TLS-layer compression. Additionally the attack works against any cipher suite. Against a stream cipher the attack is simpler: The difference in sizes across response bodies is much more granular in this case. If a block cipher is used additional work must be done to align the output to the cipher text blocks.The flaw makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to obtain plaintext secret values.'
Recommendation:
Mitigation The following mitigation possibilities are available: 1. Disabling HTTP compression 2. Separating secrets from user input 3. Randomizing secrets per request 4. Masking secrets (effectively randomizing by XORing with a random secret per request) 5. Protecting vulnerable pages with CSRF 6. Length hiding (by adding random number of bytes to the responses) 7. Rate-limiting the requests Note: The mitigations are ordered by effectiveness (not by their practicality - as this may differ from one application to another).
I am using the version 15.2.62
'SSL/TLS connections are vulnerable to the 'BREACH' (Browser Reconnaissance & Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext) attack.Angelo Prado Neal Harris and Yoel Gluck reported that SSL/TLS attacks are still viable via a 'BREACH' (Browser Reconnaissance & Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext) attack which they describe as: While CRIME was mitigated by disabling TLS/SPDY compression (and by modifying gzip to allow for explicit separation of compression contexts in SPDY) BREACH attacks HTTP responses. These are compressed using the common HTTP compression which is much more common than TLS-level compression. This allows essentially the same attack demonstrated by Duong and Rizzo but without relying on TLS-level compression (as they anticipated). It is important to note that the attack is agnostic to the version of TLS/SSL and does not require TLS-layer compression. Additionally the attack works against any cipher suite. Against a stream cipher the attack is simpler: The difference in sizes across response bodies is much more granular in this case. If a block cipher is used additional work must be done to align the output to the cipher text blocks.The flaw makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to obtain plaintext secret values.'
Recommendation:
Mitigation The following mitigation possibilities are available: 1. Disabling HTTP compression 2. Separating secrets from user input 3. Randomizing secrets per request 4. Masking secrets (effectively randomizing by XORing with a random secret per request) 5. Protecting vulnerable pages with CSRF 6. Length hiding (by adding random number of bytes to the responses) 7. Rate-limiting the requests Note: The mitigations are ordered by effectiveness (not by their practicality - as this may differ from one application to another).